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A markel determined allocation of foreign exchange (FOREX) and the exchange rate is 
considered necassary to an improvement in (he compelitiveness of the Nigerian economy 
both internally and in its trade and financial transactions with the rest of the world. 
However, the realisation of the advantages of the market by an economy depends on the 
functional character of its markets and its public institutions. This study has therefore 
analysed from an institutional perspective, the evidence on Nigeria's FOREX manage-
ment and exchange rate policy from 1960 to 1990. The outcome of each policy regime 
was compared in terms of (a) the trend in exchange rate (b) degree of exchange rate 
premium and (c) structure of FOREX allocation. Evidence suggests that in spite of the 
reform of 1986, the naira exchange rate is still not competitively determined and the 
allocation of FOREX remains inconsistent with the requirements for the long-term de-
velopment of the Nigerian economy. Evidence also indicate that the post-reform ex-
change rate policy has been adversely affected by government's expansive fiscal and 
monetary policy. The major conclusion of the study is that given government's 
macroeconomic policy and the character of the markets within which FOREX was traded 
and the linkages between them, the naira exchange rate has little chance of covergence 
and as a result, the possibilities for distortions in the allocation of FOREX remain very 
high. 
I Introduction 
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a period of chronic macroeconomic decline in 
most least developed countries (LDCs) as evidenced by the stagnation of their econo-
mies, internal structural imbalances and severe external imbalances. These problems 
seem to have been more severe in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, whose econo-
mies have been exposed to greater external and domestic economic shocks (Obidegwu, 
1990). These crises have necessitated radical changes to reduce distortions in the econo-
mies in the face of mounting domestic and external pressures. 
One crucial area of radical change for most of these countries has been their 
foreign exchange rate policy; it was believed that all or most of their currencies were 
over-valued due to the policy of fixed exchange rates which they adopted. In response to 
this need for major changes, many SSA countries modified their exchange rate regimes 
to make them more flexible and responsive to current economic conditions (Ndulo, 1990). 
Such modifications have included steep devaluation, adoption of crawling peg regimes 
and the auctioning of available foreign exchange resources. "In broad terms, developing 
countries that have adopted any form of the flexible exchange rate system option are 
those suffering from severe balance of payments difficulties compounded by accumu-
lated external payments arrears who, in addition, lack official foreign exchange reserves 
needed to support a fixed exchange rate which has come under intense market pressure" 
(Oyejide, 1989). Table 1 gives some detail of some developing countries' choice of 
floating market arrangements. 
Since independence, Nigeria, like most LDCs, has practiced a system of ex-
change control, until the drastic change in 1986, when a more flexible exchange rate 
regime was introduced. Before the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) in 1986, Nigeria's economy was characterized by serious structural distortions 
! and external imbalances. These have been linked to the overvaluation of the naira. An-
I other causal factor is the collapse of international primary commodity market prices 
including that of oil, on which Nigeria was strongly dependent. Towards the end of 1985 
to early 1986, the Nigerian government, rather than continuing with the ad-hoc policy 
measures which had been tried in the past for economic recovery, decided to undertake a 
comprehensive structural adjustment programme, the bedrock of which was a more flex-
ible foreign exchange rate system. It was decided that auctioning the available foreign 
exchange (FOREX) resources via the market would be the best method of achieving a 
realistic external value for the naira. 
The Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) was an element of the SAP 
introduced in September 1986. It aimed at evolving a sustainable market-determined 
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exchange rate for the naira. The decision to introduce the SFEM, with the auction sys-
tem as the operative mechanism, was taken as part of the adjustment policies to correct 
the distortions in all major sectors of the economy, reduce imports, stimulate exports, 
especially of non-oil goods, and pave the way for economic growth (CBN, 1986). 
This decision marked a major shift in exchange rate policy and in the manage-
ment of foreign exchange resources. To appraise the effectiveness of this change, it is 
necessary to document the institutional reforms and their particular implications for the 
allocation of FOREX and the determination of the rate of exchange of the naira. 
The purpose of this study is to report, from an institutional perspective, Nigeria's 
experience of using the auction system in the allocation of foreign exchange, as a way of 
arriving at 'a realistic exchange rate'. In addition, the various modifications to the sys-
tem at different stages of the SFEM and the causal forces will be identified and analyzed. 
Section II briefly discusses the research framework that provides the basis for 
the analysis carried out in later sections. Section III is a chronological report of the 
Nigerian foreign exchange policies from 1960 through 1990. The major emphasis is on 
the institutional framework through which FOREX rates have been determined. Section 
IV presents post-reform FOREX allocating mechanisms, highlighting the market types, 
operators in the different markets and what convergent rules were in place in the markets 
over the period of the study. The last part of Section IV evaluates the competitiveness of 
the FOREX markets and the consequence of this for a homogeneous, and hence com-
petitive, exchange rate. In Section V, a comparative analysis of the pre- and post-reform 
periods will be done. This analysis will, among other things, compare exchange rate 
trends, the differentials among various market rates, and the allocation of FOREX on a 
sectoral basis during the two periods under comparison. The last section of the paper 
summarises the major findings of the study and draws some general conclusions. 
Source: J.P. Quirk etal., 1987, "Floating Exchange Rates in Developing Countries: Experience with Auctions and Interbank Markets", IMF Occasional 
Papers, No. 53, Washington D.C., l,F. 
II. Research framework 
The purpose of this section is to specify the framework within which this study is con-
ducted. It also identifies the relevant theoretical issues that arc of critical importance (o 
the study. 
The study deals essentially with a macroeconomic policy instrument, the ex-
change rate. The character of macroeconomic policy is therefore of relevance to the 
study. The main features of macroeconomic policy are: 1). multiplicity of goals and 
instruments and 2). conflict among policy goals. It is to be expected that policy instru-
ments would be inter-related. As a result, exchange rate policy, which is an clement in 
the set of macroeconomic policies, would be closely associated with other elements of 
the set, i.e. fiscal, monetary, income and trade policies. The realization of the objectives 
of macroeconomic policy would invariably require a consistent macroeconomic policy 
environment. This seems to explain why the Nigerian government decided to adopt 
certain fiscal, trade and monetary policies when it decided to alter the direction of ex-
change rate policy in the third quarter of 1986. 
It is useful to identify (he specific character of the linkages among macro policy 
instruments before policies are articulated. The issue of the institutional framework of 
policy is an important aspect of this inquiry. In fact, a relevant causal analysis needs an 
understanding of the basic institutional framework of the various macro policy instru-
ments. A characterization of the institutional framework of Nigeria's exchange rate policy 
is, therefore a relevant step in a causal analysis. 
Exchange rate refers to the price of a domestic currency relative to a foreign 
currency. It assumes relevance largely because of the cross-border flow of commodity 
and financial assets. The particular policies adopted by each country would, as a result, 
have consequences for its trade relations with other countries. 
K Since exchange rate is a price, the important consideration is the mechanism for 
its determination. The mechanism through which exchange rate is determined reflects 
the exchange rate policy of nations. 
In the theoretical literature, there are two major mechanisms. The distinguish-
ing feature between the two is institutional, which explains why the mechanisms corre-
spond to the two major economic institutions in real economies, i.e., the government and 
the market. The government may dominate market mechanisms such that, independent 
of the market, it determines, or more appropriately fixes, the rate of exchange. This is 
more likely to be associated with control regimes. Where the government allows the 
market institution free rein, the exchange rate is determined through the market process. 
Arguably, each regime reflects the dominant economic philosophy of the state. 
Fixed exchange rates tend, as a result, to be associated with controlled econo-
mies, while flexible exchange rates tend to be associated with liberal economies. This is 
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why, to a large extent, a shift in policy, e.g., from fixed to floating, may require a shift in 
economic philosophy. 
There is intense controversy on the effectiveness of the two regimes that deter-
mine the exchange rate. This centres around the extent to which each regime facilitates 
domestic and external economic balance. The exchange rate is conceptualized as a link 
between the price structures of nations and, as a result, is important to patterns of inter-
national commodity flows and the international mobility of capital resource (Bogunjoko, 
1991). 
Before the arguments supporting each exchange rate determination mechanism 
are highlighted, it may be useful to distinguish between the real and the nominal ex-
change rates. Real exchange rate expresses the value of the domestic currency in terms 
of real purchasing power. The ratio of the domestic prices of two economies measures 
real exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate expresses the quantity of one currency in 
terms of another, e.g., N:$. 
The real exchange rate is perceived as sending the right signals which induce the 
correct structures of domestic and external absorption and production (see Levich, 1985 
and Oyejide, 1986). Given this premise, the contention in the controversy revolves 
around the extent to which the nominal exchange rate, which is what is actually directly 
determined (in any exchange rate regime), varies from the real. If the variance is non-zero, 
the implication is that the mechanism for determining the nominal exchange rate is 
distortionary. 
Ojo (1990) emphasized this when he insisted that: 'an inappropriate exchange 
rate ... tends to create instability in the FOREX market and to perpetuate widespread 
distortions in international economic transactions'. 
Theoretically, the fixed exchange rate regime which is operated by the govern-
ment through its monetary authorities (who determine the nominal exchange rate inde-
pendent of the market) is analyzed as potentially distortionary. This distortion manifests 
itself either in over-valuation or under-valuation. More often, particularly in the case of 
LDCs, the problem is overvaluation. Because it stimulates import demand and sup-
presses export supply, it creates disequilibrium in the FOREX market and deficit in trade 
balances. Thus, as is usual with price control, a broader set of controls are necessitated 
by the resultant disequilibrium. 
Exchange rate controls were, however, the dominant policy in Nigeria before 
September, 1986. This policy seems to have been adopted because of arguments that 
exchange control ensures the stability of the currency. Ward (1965) emphasized this 
attribute of a fixed exchange rate regime. Even more fundamental, Johnson (1970) and 
Todaro (1977) argue that given the structure of LDCs, the optimal exchange rate policy 
is a fixed rather than a flexible exchange rate regime. Todaro (1977), made the point 
thus: "flexible exchange rates are not thought to be desirable especially in the Third 
World ... because they are unpredictable ... and susceptible to foreign and domestic cur-
rency speculation. Such unpredictable fluctuations can wreak havoc with both short and 
long-range development plans". 
The proponents of a flexible exchange rate deny the propositions that fixed re-
gimes generate exchange rate stability and economy wide benefits. Quirk (1989), Odozi 
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(1986) and Dibua (1990) argue that a fixed exchange rate regime cannot guarantee sta-
bility since, as Quirk puts it, the rates must be adjusted from time to time. Odozi (1986) 
argues that pegged currencies often float against other currencies. Odozi and Dibua 
(1990) assert that the cost of controls and the rules governing FORBX allocation gener-
ate high inefficiencies in the FOREX market, and hence the economy. Generally, a flex-
ible regime, an antithesis of controls, is seen to generate efficient FOREX allocations 
and thence efficient resource allocation and use within economies. 
The historical experiences of countries have shown that some economics have, 
at given points, adopted more than one exchange rate regime, or have adopted an eclec-
tic regime which taps the advantages of the two extreme regimes. A dual exchange rate 
regime is an example of the former, and an adjustable peg, of the latter. These notwith-
standing, the two institutional frameworks, i.e., government and the market, are the mecha-
nisms for determining exchange rates. An efficient exchange rate regime may therefore 
depend, among other things, on the character of the institutions and operational effi-
ciency of the institutions. As a result, this study intends to identify and describe the 
operational structures of the Nigerian institutional framework of exchange rate determi-
nation. This is necessary for an analysis of the effectiveness of exchange rate regimes in 
Nigeria. The paper goes beyond theoretical generations to examine whether, given the 
specific structures of Nigeria's market, I. a market directed allocation of FOREX is 
growth inducing; and 2. a market determined exchange rate is competitive. 
The shift in Nigeria's exchange rate policy from controls to deregulation has 
made the market mechanism dominant in the management of FORBX. The extent to 
which the market approximates a competitive market becomes critical to achieving a 
competitive exchange rate and an efficient allocation of FOREX. Moreover, a homoge-
neous rate would necessarily require the essential characteristics of a competitive mar-
ket, i.e., free entry and exit, perfect information and perfect mobility, or at least approxi-
mations of these attributes. These issues guide the analysis of market types in Section 
IV. 
III. Nigeria's foreign exchange policy 
1 9 5 9 - 9 0 
The documentation of the FOREX policy in Nigeria is carried out over two distinct 
periods. The first period - 1959 to mid-1986 - was when the fixed exchange rate policy 
was adopted in Nigeria. From July 1986 there was a sharp departure from the fixed 
exchange rate regime to a more flexible regime. The institutional framework for FORFX 
allocation is the basic distinguishing feature of both periods, as it shall become apparent. 
Between 1959 and mid-1986 
The first phase of the Nigerian exchange policy began in earnest in 1959 with the estab-
lishment of the central bank of Nigeria (CBN). The CBN was specifically set up to 
manage (he country's currency with the objective of attaining a sound and stable na-
tional currency. Using the pegged exchange rate system, the Nigerian pound was fixed 
by the 1958 Central Bank Ordinance at par with the pound sterling (Obaseki, 1991). It 
was the CBN's responsibility, as stated in the ordinance, to buy and sell its currency on 
demand at this rate. Later on, in 1962, the exchange control act was enacted by the CBN, 
which vested the Minister of Finance with the authority to grant approvals in respect of 
FOREX transactions, while the CBN handled private sector transactions through autho-
rized dealers (commercial banks). 
The 1962 Act, rather than allowing the Nigerian pound to be fixed at par with 
the pound sterling, was defined in terms of gold, which meant that Nigeria could, at any 
time, dccide on whatever adjustments needed to be made in the off icial rate between its 
currency and other currencies. This, of course, was supposed to send strong signals to 
the international community that Nigeria as an independent nation was free to take deci-
sions on her own. The wisdom of the action was later justified when, in 1967, the pound 
sterling was devalued without any effect on the Nigerian pound, which was at the time 
autonomous. 
In 1973, the Nigerian currency was decimalized and changed from the pound to 
the naira. This time, seemingly forgetting the wisdom of autonomy, the exchange rate 
was fixed to the US dollar. When the US dollar was devalued in 1973, the value of the 
naira also fell because of its direct relationship with it. This became an issue of concern 
when the dollar persistently depreciated, By the end of 1973, the Nigerian government 
decided to discontinue any direct relationship between the naira and either the pound 
sterling or the US dollar. 
Between 1974 and 1975, the decision of Nigeria to manage its own currency, 
independent of the fortunes of the pound sterling and the US dollar, led to the adoption 
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of a "policy of progressive appreciation" of the naira. This policy was greatly enhanced 
by Nigeria's strong position from increased earnings from crude oil exports. To further 
minimize the effect of fluctuations of exchange rates of other major currencies on the 
naira, a policy of pegging to a basket of international currencies of seven of Nigeria's 
partners; the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, Japan, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands; was adopted. This was expected to stabilize the effective exchange rate 
of the naira under the assumption that the loss in value due to the devaluation of one 
currency in the basket would be compensated by the appreciation of another currency in 
the same basket. This arrangement was thought to have the advantage of dampening the 
effect of the external exchange rate changes on prices and the balance of payments (BOP). 
It is important to note that from about 1973 to late 1977, Nigeria had accumu-
lated sizeable foreign reserves arising from the oil boom, which made it possible for the 
fixed exchange rate policy to be managed through reserve movements. Official reserve 
depletion helped to meet private excess demand; however, there was a reluctance to 
devalue when the reserve later became too low to support the fixed exchange rate. To 
curb the situation, FOREX from the Central Bank was strictly rationed and controlled 
through an import licensing system meant to protect official reserves. The problem was 
that when the level of reserve increased, the naira appreciated, but was never allowed to 
depreciate when the reserve level fell. This gave an impression that a continuous drain 
on the official reserves could sustain an overvaluation of the naira. To reverse this trend, 
strict exchange control measures were adopted, which were: 
• Reduction of consultancy and technical fees remittable by foreign consult-
ing companies from 60% to 50%; 
Reduction of business trips from 15 to 14 days maximum per trip; 
• Reduction of basic travel allowances to pilgrims and other travellers; etc. 
Attempts were also made to adopt schemes that would ensure the success of the ex-
change control measures, such as: 
1. The establishment of the exchange control (anti-sabotage) decree of 1977 which 
established some tribunals to try FOREX offenders; 
2. From 1979, the establishment of the Comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme 
(CISS) to ensure a preshipment check on prices, volume and quality of imported 
goods worth over US$33,000. The scheme was also expected to check other 
FOREX malpractices, such as: 
Overloading of invoices for the purpose of transferring FOREX abroad; 
Under-invoicing of imports to pay less import duties; 
Importation of obsolete plant and machinery at the prices of new ones; 
• Importation of out-dated and rotten food items and expired drugs; 
Falsification of documents; 
FOREX claims for goods not imported or services not rendered; 
Overpricing of federal government projects with a view to keeping the gains 
abroad in FOREX; etc. 
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From 1980 to 1981, the degree of exchange control was reduced, hugely due to an im-
provement in the BOP brought about by positive developments in the international oil 
market. This soft-pedalling was also due to the difficulty associated with tight exchange 
control regulations. The relatively liberal system of exchange controls in the early 1980s 
was mainly aimed at curbing rampant abuse and malpractices in respect of FOREX 
transactions, such as over-invoicing of import bills, smuggling of currencies and goods 
across (he borders and false documentation of import bills. Because the policy was not 
sustainable, controls had to be tightened again. 
The period between 1982 and 1986 marked the last phase of exchange control in 
Nigeria. The stringent exchange control measures, as in earlier periods, was preceded 
by severe BOP pressures. As part of the global economic recession, Nigeria at this time 
was exper iencing severe economic difficulties. FOREX receipts both from oil and non-oil 
exports were consistently less than the disbursements for imports. Between 1981 and 
1984, for example, the total exports receipts figures were less than the total imports (see 
Table 2). This led to a slide in the external reserves. Because short-term external loans 
were used to finance these deficits, external debt began to accumulate. 
Responding to the severe economic pressures of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982 was passed with the aim of correcting the BOP 
problems and the distortions in the domestic production and consumption pattern. The 
Act provided for: 
Reduction of business travel allowance from N3,000 to N2,500 per annum 
for registered companies; 
Re-imposition of pre-shipment inspection for raw materials, spare parts, 
books and fish; 
• Reduction in repatriable consultancy fees from 30% to 20%; etc. 
Despite the exchange control measures of the 1982 Act, evidence indicates that the Ni-
gerian external sector continued to experience problems, primarily due to the develop-
ment in the international oil market which caused the price of oil to fall and FOREX 
earnings to decline. Statistics (see Table 2) show that despite the 1982 Act, total export 
earnings reduced from US$14,951.2 million in 1982 to US$11,679.2 million in 1983. 
While the total imports for 1982 was US$ 17,095.6 million, in 1983 it was US$ 12,095.6 
million, a reduction caused by the stringent controls on imports. Despite the reduction in 
imports the debt service ratio for 1983 was 17.5%, as compared to 8.9% in 1982. 
In 1984, exchange control measures were even tighter, partly due to the growing 
external debt outstanding which totalled US$19,021.14 million in 1984, yp from 
$14,620.49 million in 1983. in 1984 and 1985, other restrictive measures were introducted. 
These included regulatory administrative measures such as the Form "M" registration, 
monitoring of import licence use, and matching the value of import licence with the 
FOREX budget for imports. Other measures included the prescription of a "management" 
Table 2: Selected macroeconomic indicators for Nigeria: 1970-90 (US$ million) 
Year Oil exports Total exports Total imports External debt Outstanding Debt service ratio (%) External reserves 
1970 N.A. 901.6 829.9 68.43 3.5 218.96 
1971 N.A. 1,495.3 1,315.6 308.88 2.3 405.22 
1972 N.A. 1,818.5 1,877.5 400.37 1.8 370.27 
1973 2,605.6 3,399.89 2,755.9 420.89 1.3 574.56 
1974 7,067.4 8,442.2 3,473.0 515.33 0.5 5.199.56 
1975 7,719.7 8,917.3 8,959.5 568.38 0.7 5,490.63 
1976 8,698.0 10,502.6 11,014.3 597.86 0.5 4,879.93 
1977 9,975.9 12,003.8 12,807.5 768.51 0.3 3,895.42 
1978 8,287.5 12,538.4 14,749.1 2,063.71 2.7 1,965.48 
1979 14,503.5 17,351.0 14,280.4 2,673.64 1.7 5,048.64 
1980 22,932.6 25,979.3 21,586.2 3,413.63 0.7 9,957.09 
1981 17,471.5 21,449.2 26,443.8 3,854.41 5.0 4,009.16 
1982 12,178.5 14,951.2 17,028.5 13,102.10 8.9 1,524.97 
1983 10,192.5 11,679.2 12,095.6 14,620.49 17.5 1,002.37 
1984 11,016.1 12,121.4 11,656.9 19,021.14 29.1 1,413.18 
1985 11,367.2 12,310.2 11,731.7 19,375.85 33.2 1,839.02 
1986 5,742.5 6,979.5 6,481.9 32,606.07 29.4 2,821.85 
1987 4,659.2 5,510.3 5,312.8 25,388.93 11.9 1,169.75 
1988 4,924.9 5,229.2 5,561.9 32,195.24 25.7 721.30 
1989 5,912.3 6,984.7 5,837.0 32,645.45 23.1 1,827.47 
1990 7,437.1 9,562.1 7,437.6 37,058.05 31.3 4,348.16 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (various years). 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS A N D T H E MANAGEMENT O F EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN NIGERIA 11 
system of allocation of FOREX on a sectoral and monthly basis. The FOREX market 
was liberalised through the introduction of an import licence not valid for FOREX, by 
which imports, financed through off-shore sources, were allowed. 
A strict exchange control was maintained throughout 1985 to mid-1986 with 
some modifications made in 1986. New measures were put in place to improve on what 
already existed, such as: 
• The suspension of the BTA pegged at N2,5(K) per annum for registered 
companies in 1983; 
• The re-enforcement of the 1977 anti-sabotage decree; 
• An embargo on external borrowing, except for projects deemed crucial to 
the survival of the public interest; 
• A ban on importation of some commodities, such as rice and maize, with 
effect from 1st October 1985. 
There is no doubt that these strict control measures were progressively intensified until 
mid-1986 in a desperate attempt to control the allocation of a declining inflow of FOREX. 
Because exports are the major determinant of FOR EX inflow, the Nigerian gov-
ernment throughout the period in question tried to promote them. This was considered 
even more important given the heavy dependence of the Nigerian economy on the exter-
nal sector. The authorities, therefore, considered it important not only to promote ex-
ports but to diversify the export base. This led to the promulgation of the 1976 exports 
promotion decree giving legal backing to all exports incentives already introduced. As a 
result the Export Promotion Council was established to promote Nigeria's non-oil ex-
ports and diversify the export base. At the same time, the marketing boards already in 
place were dissolved and replaced with commodity boards in 1977. The 1986 Federal 
Government budget contained proposals for the establishment of export free zones and 
import duty concessions for export manufacturing. Although several packages of incen-
tives followed these budget proposals, such as the retention of 25% of export proceeds 
by exporters in a bid to promote exports, many of the incentives were never imple-
mented. 
The management of the exchange value of the naira in 1985 to mid-1986, as in 
the few preceding years, had two major objectives. The first was that it should reflect 
the fundamental economic conditions of the country, which was experiencing serious 
BOP problems. The second was that the exchange value should respond to movements 
in the other exchange rates in the international exchange markets. It became apparent 
during the middle part of 1986 that the ad-hoc measures established to correct the severe 
crisis, had proved incapable of resolving it. The policy response was therefore a shift 
away from an exchange control regime to a market-directed or deregulated regime. 
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Between Mid-1986 and 1990 
In place of the exchange control regime prevalent between 1959 and mid-1986, a liber-
alized system was introduced in July 1986 within the framework of an SAP. Among 
others, the SAP aimed to 1. achieve fiscal and BOP viability; 2. lessen the dominance of 
unproductive investments in the public sector by a rationalisation of public enterprises 
through privatization and commercialization; 3. reduce the level of unemployment; and 
4. bring the economy back on the path of steady and balanced growth (CBN, 1986). 
Attempting to achieve BOP and fiscal viability generated the need for a market-determined 
exchange rate mechanism - the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) - and the 
adoption of fiscal austerity and monetary restraint, which theoretically are expected to 
induce the realisation of a BOP equilibrium. A liberal FOREX market is expected, 
theoretically, to impact positively on domestic production and absorption via an efficient 
exchange rate and, hence, allocation. 
For this reason, the key policy element of SAP is the SFEM which was intro-
duced in September, 1986. It had the following four main objectives: 
1. To enable the naira find its true value; 
2. To achieve an optimal a l locat ion of FOREX resources through 
market-determined rates; 
3. To eliminate gradually the parallel market; 
4. To eliminate the vices associated with the import licence regime; etc. 
SFEM was basically established to provide an institutional framework - the auction 
through which "a realistic market-determined exchange rate" could evolve (CBN, 1986). 
It was hoped that the rate so determined would eliminate the overvaluation of the Naira 
while, at the same time, reduce the excessive pressure on the limited foreign reserves 
which had significantly dropped by 1986 from the 1980 figure (see Table 2). 
The key mechanism for FOREX management from mid-1986 to 1990 was the 
SFEM which was conceived within a market institutional framework - the auction for 
the determination of an appropriate exchange rate for the naira. The SFEM was ex-
pected to encourage an increase in domestic output and FOREX receipts, curtail FOREX 
expenditure and more specifically, result in a more rational allocation and utilization of 
FOREX resources and reduce FOREX volatility. In essence, it was expected that SFEM 
operation would make FOREX management less costly to administer, and more effi-
cient to operate. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has been the major source of supply to the 
SFEM since its inception, for the sole reason that it controls most of the nation's FOREX 
from the export of crude petroleum. Sales of FOREX in the SFEM made through deals 
concluded at periodic auctions between the CBN and the authorized dealers. The auc-
tion provided for bidding sessions where authorized dealers competed for available 
FOREX until a market determined exchange rate evolved. 
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The mechanism for determining the exchange rate of the naira is expected to 
induce a more rational use of Nigeria's scarce foreign exchange resource. This expecta-
tion is anchored on the theoretical benefits of the market mechanism. However, whether 
these theoretical benefits can be realised in Nigeria depends strongly on the character 
and the operational efficiency of the Nigerian market process. Thus, the degree of com-
petitiveness of the market directly influences the size of distortions in the market. The 
point is that government controls do not have a monopoly over distortions: distorted and 
uncompetitive markets independent of government regulations generate distortions. A 
mere shift in policy by itself may therefore not be sufficient to induce efficiency. 
Since the introduction of a liberal exchange rate policy, the institution of exchange rate 
determination has undergone periodic changes: 
• In 19H7, both the First-Tier and Second-Tier markets, which had simulta-
neously operated since July 1986, were merged. With this merger, a new 
market - the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM) - was created. This was 
operated solely by the use of the auction. However, alongside this, the 
banks were allowed to buy and sell FOREX between themselves, autono-
mously from the FEM. 
As a result of the abuse of the privileges by banks operating the autono-
mous market, in 1989 the autonomous market was abolished, Inter-bank 
Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) emerged, and the auction was used as 
the pricing mechanism for FOREX. Also in 1989, the Bureau de Change 
was established to enlarge the scope of the officially recognised FOREX 
market with the main aim of making FOREX available to small users who 
were unable to compete for FOREX under the IFEM. 
• There were also some changes made in the pricing policy under the auc-
tion, in a bid to make the market more efficient and to arrive at a "realistic 
exchange rate". Over time, the pricing system has changed from average 
rate pricing system (ARPS), to marginal rate pricing system (MRPS), to the 
Dutch auction system (DAS) with marginal rate. 
These changes and their effects on the operational efficiency of exchange rate determi-
nation are examined in more detail in the next section. 
IV. The post-reform management of forex 
Since September 1986 the market assumed prominence as the major institutional frame-
work for managing FOREX. Between 1986 and 1990. three distinct markets within 
which FOREX was exchanged can be identified and they were: 
Official market; 
The bureau dc change; 
The parallel market. 
Table 3 shows that all the markets have never co-existed simultaneously; rather, 
a combination of market types have been in operation at one point or another. The 
general pattern is, in fact, an evolutionary process of transformation in market structures 
over the period as indicated by Figure 1. It should be noted that of the market types 
identified, the parallel market, among other things, is informal, i.e., it docs not operate 
within the context of any official regulation. 
In tracing the evolutionary patterns in the FOREX process, the discussion will 
focus on key issues such as the objectives of the markets, the operators within each 
market type and what pricing policies exist in each market at specific points and over 
time. By the large, the reference point will be the degree of competitiveness within the 
exchange process. In this context, regulations/interventions and the reasons informing 
them will be identified and evaluated. This is necessary as intervention on its own is not 
adverse; what is distortionary are ad hoc interventions, i.e. those not based on a critical 
analysis. 
Official markets 
As can be seen from figure 1, the official 1 FOREX markets have been the First-Tier 
Foreign Exchange Market (FFEM), the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), 
the FOREX Market (FEM) and the Inter-bank FOREX Market (IFEM). 
During the reform period, the FOREX administration started with a simulta-
neous operation of the FFEM and the SFEM. Although not a market in the real sense of 
the word, the FFEM was an arrangement whereby the CBN released FOREX to cover 
applications that have received prior exchange control approval by a competent author-
ity. It was a fixed exchange rate market, while the SFEM was auction market. The five 
groups of transactions covered by the FFEM included: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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IFEM 
August 1989 -
Dec. 1990 
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1. Transactions covcred by a specific import licence issued in 1985 or 1986 
for which a confirmed and irrevocable letter of credit had been established 
on or before the last day immediately preceding the commencement of 
SFEM; 
2. Capital transfers, profits, dividends and other invisible payments for which 
approval had been granted before the SFEM commenced; 
3. Public or private sector transactions relating to debt service obligations that 
were due and payable, official contributions and grants to international 
organisations and remittances to Nigerian missions abroad; 
4. Net proceeds of air tickets sold by foreign airlines up to and including the 
last day immediately preceding SFEM's commencement, in as much as the 
first leg of the journey out of Nigeria had stalled before the date of SFEM's 
commencement; 
5. Any transactions valid for foreign exchange in respect of which advance 
import duty on Form CI88A had been paid, a Clear Report of Findings 
issued by the Inspection Agent, and a document submitted to (he CBN for 
issue of cover not later than the last day immediately preceding SFEM's 
commencement. 
All the first-tier transactions were to be settled by the CBN at the rates of exchange 
prevailing at the date when: 
• All documentation collected from the CBN were submitted back to the CBN; 
The obligation to which the documentation relates had, having regard to the 
nature of such transaction, become due and payable; and 
• The corresponding naira component of the transaction has been deposited 
with CBN. 
It is important to note here that, during this early period, the FOREX source officially 
was made available to both the FFEM and SFEM. The CBN, had a monopoly in the 
official markets at this time. Sales of FOREX in the SFEM were made through deals 
concluded at weekly auctions at the CBN. The frequency of the auctions were reduced 
to fortnightly later in the process. The main distinguishing factor between the FFEM 
and the SFEM was the mechanism for the determination of exchange rates. This gener-
ated dual exchange rates. With the SFEM responding to guided market forces in a situ-
ation where demand for FOREX was always greater than supply, exchange rates soared 
far above the fixed FFEM rates. For example, at the first SFEM bidding session of 26 
September 1986, while the FFEM rate was fixed at N1.5691 :US $ 1, the SFEM produced 
a rate through the auction of N4.6174:US $ 1. This was a 66% depreciation of the SFEM 
compared to the FFEM rate. It was observed that this dual system of allocating FOREX 
was not competitive enough and that further modifications needed to be made to make 
the market more liberal. 
As a result of this, in accordance with the SFEM Decree of 1986, the FFEM and the SFEM were merged on 2 July 1987 to form the FEM. This merger was expected to 
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enhance the competitiveness of FOREX allocation. However, alongside this modified 
version of what existed before, the CBN allowed banks to operate an autonomous FOREX 
market where Authorized Dealers could buy and sell FOREX at a market-determined 
rate without going through the CBN auction process or even confirming with CBN on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis. This was expected to improve business in the banks 
and to remove some of the delays and bottlenecks associated with the auction process. It 
was also expected that, by sourcing autonomously, the demand put on the limited supply 
in the official auction market would be reduced, thereby causing an appreciation of the 
naira in the official FEM market. 
However, it was observed later that there was a widespread abuse of the deregu-
lation of the market in the banking system. The Authorized Dealers kept (he autono-
mous rates permanently high, reflecting a faster depreciation of (he naira in the autono-
mous market than in (he official FEM market. For instance, the autonomous rates during 
the period January to August, 1988, ranged from N4.3611 to N6.8800, while the rates in 
FEM were in the range of N4.1740 to N4.5440; (he autonomous rate showing a premium 
of between 4.46% and 43.52% over FEM rates (see Table 1). This development led to a 
further modification that cancelled the existence of the autonomous market at the end of 
1988. 
In January 1989, the IFEM, a unification of FEM and autonomous markets was 
created. With the IFEM, the naira exchange rate at the bidding sessions became rela-
tively stable. For example, the stability can be seen when one compares the monthly 
average of N7.089 in January 1989 to N7.6500 in December 1989 (see Table &'). The 
system continued in 1990 with an opening average rate of N7.820 in January, 1990, 
which slowly depreciated to an average of N8.7071 in December, 1990. 
The whole process of FOREX acquisition and allocation under IFEM became 
very technical and sophisticated. Transactions in FOREX no longer ended with the 
scheduling of approved exchange control forms of CBN -unidirectional transaction aimed 
mostly at obtaining FOREX cover for imports, as with the regime of fixed exchange 
rate. The Authorized Dealers were much more involved in several areas of the opera-
tion, such as: rate determination, bid sessions, success rate, interbank dealings, 
across-the-countcr deals and monitoring and managing FOREX balance. 
Rate determination, for instance, requires a high degree of intelligence. Banks, 
in quoting for FOREX at IFEM, took several factors into consideration and crucial among 
these were competitors' activities and clients' willingness, ability and commitment to 
pay at the emergent rates plus spread. 
Having a reasonable degree of success at bid sessions actually becamc a night-
mare for FOREX dealers, given that the degree of success had a direct bearing on the 
bank's image, patronage and, therefore, profitability through income that was generated 
in the process. One notes that with IFEM, banks were more conscious than ever of the 
need to ensure high success rates of the auction market to satisfy their customers. 
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participation in the official market 
The principal participants in the official FOREX market are the Federal Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development, the CBN, the Authorized Dealers - Commercial, 
Merchant and Development banks, reputable hotel and guest houses, and the Bureau dc 
Change decreed in 1989. 
The Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is the approving 
authority of the FOREX process. It approves public and private sector transactions 
within its jurisdiction and has the major responsibility of the overall control of the SFEM. 
The ministry is expected to issue all necessary directives that are appropriate for the 
efficient operation of the market. 
The CBN, empowered by the SFEM decree of 1986, has the responsibility of 
supervising and monitoring the operation of the FOREX market as well as issuing, from 
time to time, guidelines to regulate the procedures for transactions of SFEM, including 
the specification of the documents that may be tendered in support of an application to 
purchase FOREX in the market. The CBN is also the major supplier of FOREX to the 
market. Apart from controlling the money supply and the amount of FOREX offered for 
sale during each bidding session, the CBN also influences the movement of the ex-
change rate by a series of interventions in the market (see Table 5 for some of these 
interventions, the types of intervention and the objectives of the intervention). 
The Authorized Dealers are the main 'consumers' in the auction. Their activi-
ties are conducted under the supervision of and rules and regulations issued by, the CBN. 
The Authorized Dealers approve private sector foreign exchange applications, make for-
eign exchange allocations to customers and transfer the funds allocated within the frame-
work of the guidelines issued by (he CBN. They are required to document all transac-
tions in the interbank market in respect of transactions between their banks and the pub-
lic, and to later submit returns on their transactions to the CBN. Those Authorized Deal-
ers who fail to follow specified rules and regulations are guilty of an offcnce and liable 
to penalties which are spelt out in the Banking Act. 
Hotels and guest houses are required to receive payments in FOREX from visi-
tors to Nigeria for services rendered. The hotels and guest houses may then lodge such 
collections in foreign currency domiciliary accounts and use them for eligible transac-
tions or sell them to Authorized Dealers. However, the hotels and guest houses are re-
quired to submit monthly returns on their FOREX purchases to the CBN. 
Regulations in the official markets 
During the fixed exchange rate era, the prevailing rates were administratively deter-
mined; the general guidelines or policy regulations were essentially an in-hou.se matter 
for CBN officials. However, with the introduction of SFEM, there were some guidelines 
which regulated its operation. Guidelines under SFEM are issued to inform, educate and 
aid the Authorized Dealers and members of the public in the efficient operation of the 
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market. For example, the CBN regulations indicate that although anyone can buy and 
sell FOREX, there are Authorized Dealers whose responsibility it is to ensure that purely 
speculative transactions and others which are inconsistent with the set objectives of SFEM 
are not allowed. Regulation as to when FOREX can be sold and bought is also stated. 
Hours of business are specified to conform with normal banking hours. Guidelines are 
also issued to streamline procedures and to clarify misconceptions and ambiguity. For 
example, a guideline given by the CBN states that all foreign visitors to Nigeria shall pay 
their hotel and incidental expenses in foreign currency. However, where there is docu-
mentary evidence that an adequate amount of FOREX has been exchanged into local 
currency through licensed banks and/or Bureau de Change on arrival in the country, 
local currency will be accepted in settlement of bills by foreign visitors to Nigeria. 
Apart from the original guidelines that were issued at SFEM's inception, other 
circulars were issued to the Authorized Dealers. The guidelines which form a part of the 
foreign exchange policy in Nigeria are being reviewed periodically in line with the pre-
vailing circumstances and operation of the market. 
Pricing rules 
To try to make the market more competitive and to ensure proper allocation of available 
FOREX, several pricing policies have been adopted, especially given the modifications 
that have been made from "FFEM and SFEM" to "IFEM and autonomous market" to 
"IFEM". The three main pricing rules within the official markets (summarised in Table 
4) are: 
1. Simple average pricing; 
2. Marginal rate pricing; and 
3. Dutch Auction pricing. 
During the first two bidding sessions on 26 September, 1986 and 20 October, 1986, the 
CBN used the Simple Average Pricing of the successful bid rates in selling FOREX to 
Authorized Dealers. However, marginal rate was used as a cut-off point to determine 
successful bidders. Because this pricing method was criticised for its inability to bring 
about a "realistic exchange rate", starting from the third bidding session, the marginal 
rate was used, not only to determine successful bids, but also to debit the account of 
Authorized Dealers on the sale of FOREX to them. The marginal rate was used as the 
reference point for defining the effective rate, the selling rate and the buying rate. All 
Authorized Dealers bought FOREX from the CBN at the effective exchange rate, which 
was 0.5% above the marginal rate, while they were obliged to sell to their customers at 
0.5% above the effective rate. This pricing system was in use until the end of March 
1987 when a major change was made. 
The Dutch Auction Bidding System (DAS) was introduced on 2April, 1987. This 
was a fortnightly bidding system whereby Authorized Dealers' accounts were debited at 
their successful bid rates. The difference between this system and the previous ones is 
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that while the previous system debits the Authorized Dealers' account using the mar-
ginal rate established in the market, the DAS allowed for the debiting of the dealers' 
account using their successful bid rates. Another modification to the previous system 
was that with the DAS, the Exchange Equalisation Levy of 0.5% in the previous system 
was increased to 1.0%. The objective of the DAS was to check the frivolous and unreal-
istic bidding by Authorized Dealers. The DAS was used until the FEM and autonomous 
markets were converted to just one single unified market - the IFEM, in 1989. 
With the introduction of IFEM on 9 January, 1989, the naira exchange rate de-
termination took place through daily auctions. Banks were expected, under this arrange-
ment, to sell their FOREX to customers at not more than 1 % above the official rate. The 
daily auction of FOREX continued through 1989 and 1990 until 14 December, 1990, 
when the CBN reintroduced the DAS with the use of marginal rate. This shift back to the 
DAS was meant to check certain practices which led to the persistent pressure on the 
nana, while also returning the auction to a more competitive FOREX market. The daily 
auction was changed with this reproduction of DAS to a weekly auction, to give deal-
ers adequate time to prepare and collate their customers' bids. 
Exchange Rates 
Given the simultaneous operation of the FFEM and the SFEM, in 1986 two sets of rates 
emerged - one administratively determined and fixed, the other, under SFEM, deter-
mined through the forces of demand and supply. Given that demand for FOREX under 
the SFEM always exceeded supply, (here was a continuous depreciation of the naira in 
this market. At the firs! SFEM bidding session, for example, on 26 September, 1986, 
while the exchange rate in the FFEM was N1.5691 :US S1, the SFEM rate was N4.6174:US 
$1. A further liberalization and decentralization of this dual system to make room for 
FEM and the autonomous markets, on 2 July, 1987, did not do much to prevent the 
depreciation of the naira. 
This was aggravated by the abuse of this liberalized policy by bankers. Between 
mid-1987 and December, 1988, a wide premium had been created between the FEM 
rates and autonomous rates. The Authorized Dealers kept the autonomous rates high, 
reflecting a faster depreciation of the naira than in the official FEM market. While the 
autonomous rates during the period January to August, 1988, ranged from N4.3611 to 
N6.8800, the FEM rates ranged from N4.1740 to N4.6440. In December, 1988, the 
FEM rate was N5.3530 while the autonomous rate was N8.2856. This development led 
to the abolition of the autonomous market and the creation of a unified IFEM. However, 
this did not check the gradual but continuous depreciation of the naira from N7.0389 in 
January 1989 to N7.6500 in December that year, although compared to previous periods, 
this period witnessed a slowing down of the process, at least for some time. 
Although the government has taken some macroeconomic measures (these are 
discussed in the next section) Table 5 shows that the naira had not stopped its monotonic 
descent up till the end of 1990. 
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Table 4: Pricing rule in official FOREX market, 1986-90 
Period Pricing Rule 
A. 26-09-86-20-10-86 Simple Average/Marginal 
B. 03-11-86- 19-03-87 Marginal 
C. 02-04-87-31-12-88 Dutch Auction/Marginal 
D. 09-01-89-
The bureau de change (BDC) 
An important development in the Nigerian FOREX market was the establishment of the 
bureau de change in 1989. 
The main objective of this was to enlarge the scopc of official market transac-
tions. It was becoming obvious that some businesses that required FOREX, especially 
the smaller businesses, were unable to cope with the demands and formality associated 
with procuring FOREX from the official market directed by the CBN. Even when they 
went through the process, many of such small businesses did not eventually have access 
to much FOREX. Less documentation had a less formal nature of dealing at the Bureau, 
made them attractive sources of buying and selling FOREX. It was hoped that creating 
the Bureau dc Change would enhance efficiency in macroeconomic management (CBN, 
1989). 
Operators in the bureau de change are private entrepreneurs who have been granted legal 
recognition by government to deal in foreign exchange and provide access to FOREX in 
a convenient and informal manner. Although only a few licensed operators existed at the 
end of 1990, returns received from an average of 65 dealers show that the public pur-
chased $109.60 million from the Bureau in 1990 and the Bureau purchased a sum of 
N111.0 million from the public in 1990 alone. 
FOREX is primarily sourced from the private individuals, including business 
people who are unable to deal at the IFEM. The demand for FOREX at the Bureau is 
demand generally determines the size of demand in the Bureau. 
Participation in the bureau de change market 
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Table 5: End of period exchange rate in major FOREX Markets (N/US$) 
23 
Oate FEM Autonomous Parallel Bureau de 
Rates Rates Rates Change Rates 
December 1986 3.3166 - -
December 1987 4.1413 4.6928 4.6000 
January 1988 4.1740 4.3611 4.8560 
February 1988 4.2611 4.2850 4.5000 -
March 1988 4.3152 4.2470 4.3000 
April 1988 4.2525 5.8900 4.3000 
May 1988 4.1838 6.4943 5.4000 
June 1988 4.0574 6.6660 5.9000 
Jul /1988 4.3941 6.3328 6.3500 -
August 1988 4.6440 6.8800 6.6000 
September 1988 4.6961 5.8115 7.2000 
October 1988 4.7748 6.0362 7.3250 
November 1988 5.1479 6.4761 7.5000 
December 1988 5.3530 8.2856 8.3500 -
January 1989 7.0389 8.8500 -
February 1989 7.3828 - 10.5000 -
March 1989 7.5871 11.6200 -
April 1989 7.5808 11.4300 
May 1989 7.5051 - 11.3800 
June 1989 7.3477 11.5500 
July 1989 7.1388 - 10.5500 
August 1989 7.3000 - 10.2000 10.2000 
September 1989 7.3725 - 10.6000 10.7000 
October 1989 7.4750 - 10.6000 10.4000 
November 1989 7.5454 9.2000 9.1000 
December 1989 7.6500 - 9.6000 9.5000 
January 1990 7.8820 9.6000 9.6000 
February 1990 8.9225 9.3000 9.4000 
March 1990 7.9400 9.2000 9.3000 
April 1990 7.9400 - 9.2000 9.3000 
May 1990 7.9400 9.2600 9.3500 
June 1990 7.9424 9.4400 9.4000 
July 1990 7.9523 9.9200 9.8600 
August 1990 7.9623 9.7500 9.6800 
September 1990 7.9743 - 9.9600 9.7400 
October 1990 8.0089 - 9.9700 9.8000 
November 1990 8.3200 10.4000 10.1000 
December 1990 8.7071 - 10.4100 10.1600 
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Regulation of the bureau de change 
It is important to note that apart from the general requirements for being licensed as a 
Bureau de Change, operators are not subject to the rules and regulations by which the 
CBN governs the IFEM. However, the CBN, in creating the Bureau, specified that they 
were only allowed to deal in bank notes and coins and purchase travellers' cheques. 
They are not allowed to sell travellers' cheques. 
Exchange rate in the bureau de change 
From their inception there has been a general movement of exchange rates in the BDCs 
towards that of the parallel market. For example, while the official FEM rate for Decem-
ber 1989 was N7.6500, the BDC and parallel rates were N9.5000 and N9.6000 respec-
tively for the same month. By June, 1990 while the official rate was N7.9424, the BDC 
and parallel rates were N9.4000 and N9.4400 respectively (see Table 6). This trend 
continued, with the explanation for this that excess demand for FOREX in the FEM, 
eventually transferred to the BDC. will tend to attract higher prices. Again, the very 
simple nature of transactions in this market compared with the FEM, plus the relative 
lower risk - e.g., fake currency transactions - to the parallel market, make it attractive for 
consumers to prefer dealing with BDC operators. This drives up the demand and, conse-
quently, the exchange rate. 
The parallel market 
Although an illegal part of the FOREX market, the parallel market has existed for a long 
time. This market exists to satisfy the needs for FOREX consumers who are unable to 
satisfy such needs either in the FEM or BDC. It threatens to continue its existence as 
long as the official side of the market is underfunded and has a persistent excess demand. 
The attraction of patronising this market is the total absence of documentation 
involved in transactions. This allows for quickness in obtaining or selling FOREX with-
out disclosing much information. However, the high risk associated with dealing with 
operator in this market is mainly the inability of customers to check the genuineness of 
local or foreign currencies being exchanged. Consequently, customers may trade genu-
ine bank notes for fake foreign currencies and vice versa. Also, the speed at which the 
transaction takes place and the absence of bank note counting machines encourages the 
exchange of an inaccurate number of bank notes, and the informality and absence of 
record keeping makes it "impossible" for customers to return an inaccurately-counted 
bunch of bank notes. 
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participation in the parallel market 
Participants in the parallel market are not defined, especially as there is no legal recogni-
tion accorded to operators. As a result of this, any person who has FOREX to sell or who 
needs to purchase FOREX may become an operator in the market. However, although 
no legal recognition is given, over time operators in the market informally organize 
themselves into groups to: I), monitor the rates from the IFEM and BDC; 2). decide on 
rates in their (parallel) market; and 3). pass on information about government regulation 
that may indirectly affect them; etc. The presence of this informal group, although im-
portant to members, often does not constrain members from selling their FOREX at their 
individually determined rate. As a result, spot rates emerge which reflect the relative 
ability of the sellers and buyers to haggle. Usually, the group's predetermined rate is a 
benchmark for individual transactions. 
Regulation in the parallel market 
There is no direct regulation in the parallel market. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
operators informally create a group that ensures the proper flow of information, moni-
toring and operation of their market. Although members are not bound by "regulations" 
from government, the survival of professional operators in the market is often subject to 
the operators' willingness to subject themselves to the group's non-binding decisions. 
Exchange rate from the parallel market 
The exchange rate from the parallel market is usually higher than in the official market, 
and the exchange rate is usually arrived at through a haggling process. Professional 
operators usually have more information than non professionals. Since deals are struck 
by individuals, the convergent rate is indeterminate, depending, as it were, on the rela-
tive bargaining powers. Generally, the individual transaction rate is influenced by FEM 
and BDC rates. Evidence from Table 5 indicates a mark-up over FEM and BDC rates. If 
this is true, it may be impossible to arrive at a homogeneous rate: comparable to catch-
ing up with an object moving at a faster pace. 
Competitiveness of the markets 
It is important at this point to examine critically the FOREX markets to determine the 
degree of their competitiveness. Competitiveness is conceptualized with convention, 
i.e., the extent to which buyers and sellers influence the market price and allocation. 
The documentation of the features of the various markets undertaken above in-
dicates that none of the three market types are perfectly competitive. 
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The official market, for instance, is highly regulated by the CBN which is largely 
a monopoly (its supply is the market supply). The regulation which insists that only a 
restricted number of Authorized Dealers participate as buyers of FOREX controls entry. 
There arc also several other regulations which control the behaviour of participants. 
Table 6 documents direct intervention in the market. In this 'controlled liberalization', 
the competitiveness of the market as defined above is restricted. Besides, our informal 
inquiries from some of the Authorized Dealers (AD) have revealed that at some point the 
AD have had to match the CBN's monopoly powers by forming an unofficial cartel 
within which bid rates and allocations arc predetermined. In this context, the market 
approximates a bilateral monopoly rather than a competitive market. There has been no 
regulation along the lines of America's Anti-Trust Laws, and even if there were, it is 
doubtful it could be enforced. 3 
It is possible that the collusion by AD may be responsible for the government 
and the CBN intervening and (thereby unilaterally) altering the 'market-determined' 
exchange rate at certain points, as shown in Table 6. It is clear from the table that besides 
exchange rate fixing, there have been several interventions. 
Given the structure of the official market, particularly with respect to the con-
trols of participants, the CBN monopoly, and the strong potential for collusion by AD, it 
is almost impossible that the market determined rate would be competitive. And be-
cause there is more uncertainty on the side of buyers, given their numbers and hence the 
excess demand for FOREX (see Table 7), the pressure tends to be on the exchange rate to 
depreciate over time. This trend, as will become clear, seems to have been strengthened 
by the fiscal and monetary policies pursued by government during the period. 
The Bureau de Change and the parallel market (PM), have been less regulated 
than the official market. However, the BDC operators still have to be licensed even 
though the sellers and the buyers of FOREX to and from BDC are not controlled. The 
FOREX rate however is not determined via a tatonement process. On the contrary, 
isolated BDC tend to fix their individual rates based on: 1. the rate of other BDCs; 2. the 
official rates; and 3. the parallel market rate. Even though the fixed rates are displayed 
on display-boards, experience has shown that, similar to parallel markets, the exchange 
rate can be negotiated. Most patrons may or may not adopt a search procedure. Even 
some who do, tend to accept or take the best rate depending on whether they are selling 
or buying. Personal experience indicates that, as in the official FOREX market, there are 
strong potentials for collusion among licenced BDC in the same environment. As a 
result, competitiveness as defined earlier is almost impossible. 
The behaviour of operators in PM is not regulated since it is illegal, even though 
the law is not enforced. To a large extent, there is a strong potential for collusion among 
professional operators, i.e. the mallams who buy and sell FOREX around airports, along 
the Broad Street (where there is a high concentration of banks) in Lagos and in major 
hotels: in spite of the fact that FOREX rates are negotiated in isolation. The rates being 
fixed per individual transaction, seem to be influenced by the bargaining skills of the 
operators. However, the madams always have floors (when selling) and ceilings (when 
buying). The floor or ceiling may be influenced by what has been accepted by the group. 
Given these kind of influences, this market is imperfect. This is in spite of the multiplicity 
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Table 7: Annual CBN Supply and Authorized Dealers' Demand for FOREX, 1996-91 
Amount 
related 
($ million) 
Amount 
offered 
($ million) 
Total 
demand 
{$ million) 
Excess 
demand 
($ million) 
%Excess 
demand 
26 September-
December 1986 
871.10 916.00 1,026.41 110.41 10.76 
January-
December 1987 
2,374.10 2,350.00 2,785.45 435.50 15.63 
January-
December 1988 
2,711.10 2,910.00 3,259.97 350.00 10.74 
January-
December 1989 
2,163.20 2,398.00 17,337.90 14,939.90 86.20 
January-
December 1990 
2,501.40 2,646.10 20,196.60 17,550.50 86.90 
January-June 1991 1,531.30 1,686.80 4,788.20 3,101.40 64.80 
Source: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (various years). 
•3U® 
of buyers and sellers. 
Even though all the markets are imperfect, the official market is the most imper-
fect. The difference in the degree of competitiveness of the markets may have accounted 
for the observed difference in rates as shown in Table 7 and Figures 2 and 3. Generally, 
the official rate tends to be smaller than the BDC and PM rates. However, it may be 
debatable whether factors other than the structure of respective markets account for the 
differentials. In terms of market share, the official market accounts for the largest share 
of the FOREX market. This is because the CBN controls the FOREX from the domi-
nant source of Nigeria's FOREX inflow, i.e., oil. 
Thus, the official market is the leading market. However, unlike a theoretical 
oligopoly market where others follow the leader, i.e., take the price dictated by the leader, 
in the Nigerian FOREX exchange process, the BDC and PM use the leader's price only 
as a benchmark for mark-up. Their attractions to patrons, relative to the leader, is the 
complete absence of documentation and bureaucratic red tape: a major feature of the 
official market. Given the persistent excess demand in the official market, it is to be 
expected that the BDC and the PM would have adequate (or more) patrons. 
The introduction of BDC may have created the potential for leakage of FOREX 
from the official market to BDC. This is mainly due to the ownership structure of BDC. 
Certain banks and, even more, their management (in individual capacities), have been 
known to own BDC. The potential for manipulated rent that this arrangement generates 
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In fact, in reent times, some ADs have been accused of selling FOREX pur-
chased in offical markets to consumers through BDC they own. If the tabloids are to be 
believed, the boardroom clashed in some of the banks are in fact due to the scramble for 
the FOREX rent. These allegations need to be closely examined. If indeed BDC are 
owned by AD or their employees or management, there exists a strong potential for 
manipulation of FOREX rates. In such an enviroment, a homogeneous FOREX rate is 
impossible: and so is a realistic competitive exchange Tate. 
V. Comparative analysis of pre- and post-
reform periods 
In Section III we identified the major exchange rate policy adopted by Nigeria between 
1960 and 1990. The evidence indicates two major exchange rate regimes: fixed (1960-86) 
and flexible (1986-90). The shift in 1986 was explained by the weaknesses of the fixed 
regime in generating a realistic exchange rale for the naira, manifested in the existence 
of a high level of premium associated with FOREX rates and hence inefficiencies in its 
allocation and use. The reforms, whose institutional framework was outlined in Section 
IV, aimed at, among other things, inducing I. a realistic value of the currency; and hence, 
2. a zero premium; and 3. an efficient allocation of FOREX in Nigeria. It is necessary at 
this juncture to compare the pre- and post-reform periods based on I. the trend in ex-
change rates; 2. premium levels; and 3. the FOREX allocation structure. While it may 
be easier to quantitatively compare pre - and post-period using indicator 1, indicators 2 
and 3 would involve a high degree of inferential analysis. 
Exchange rate trend 
Table 8 shows the average exchange rate trend for the period 1970-90. It should be 
useful to compare the rates before 1986 with those after it. The prc-reform period ex-
change rate (ER), although slightly rising from year to year, was relatively stable at an 
average of N0.65:US$1.00. Although (he naira had depreciated over the period before 
1979, showing an average depreciation of 3.0%, it depreciated at an average of 10.20% 
between 1980 and 1983. There was a slight appreciation of the naira in 1984 from its 
level in 1983, but this was again reversed in 1985 when it depreciated by 14.03%. Be-
tween 1986 and 1990 - the period of the SFEM operation - there was a general upward 
movement of the N/$ exchange rate (see Table 8). Between 1985 and 1986, average 
depreciation was 49%. A sharp depreciation occurred at the beginning of the 
auction-market in September 1986 and the naira depreciated even further in 1987, at 
about 56%. The average annual depreciation over 1985 to 1990 was 31.35%. 
The major observation from Table 8 is that thcN/$ exchange rate was relatively 
stable between 1970 and 1985. The second point is that the deviations, upward and 
downward, were rather small. However, from 1986 to 1990, the exchange rate ceased to 
be stable and its movement became generally monotonic: upwards. Whether the insta-
bility and large depreciation of the currency induced the naira to find its realistic value is 
an issue that needs to be empirically established. Suffice to say that what is realistic is 
not only undefined and hence hard to establish, but the differential in the rates of various 
Table 8: Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1970-90 
Year % Dep. Average Inflation Budget Change in Credit to 
Exchange Rate Balance Money % Government 
1970 0.7142 13.81 -473.1 
1971 2.85 0.6944 15.61 199.0 6.2 -19.8 
1972 5.54 0.6579 3.21 96.8 14.4 -2.3 
1973 0.0 0.6579 5.41 296.7 22.5 -4.2 
1974 4.54 0.6293 13.41 1796.8 59.3 -4.1 
1975 2.19 0.6158 33.9^ -427.4 42.6 
1976 1.72 0.6266 21.2 -1068.2 33.5 115.6 
1977 3.09 0.6466 15.4 -901.5 29.0 111.6 
1978 1.81 0.6351 16.6 -2389.0 -3.8 59.3 
1979 5.38 0.6027 11.8 1461.7 27.0 3.0 
1980 10.20 0.5469 9.9 -1975.2 37.9 4.4 „ 
1981 9.63 0.6052 20.9 -3928.6 5.7 84.1 
1982 10.09 0.6731 7.7 -5440.4 9.1 59.3 
1983 10.32 0.7506 23.2 -3456.0 13.1 50.3 
1984 2.16 0.7672 39.6 -2557.6 11.0 15.0 
1985 14.03 0.8924 5.5 -3039.7 8.6 0.4 
1986 48.48 1.7323 5.4 -8254.3 -1.2 6.5 
1987 56.35 3.9691 14.4 -5889.7 17.1 8.3 
1988 12.51 4.5367 30.0 -12160.9 43.9 25.9 
1989 38.40 7.3651 40.9 -15266.1 35.04 10.9 
1990 8.37 8.0378 7.53 -23357.0 -
Note: 1 From 1970-74 calculated with 1960 as Base Year 
2From 1975-89 calculated with 1975 as Base Year 
^Calculated with 1985 as Base Year 
4Up to March 1989 and provisional 
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria; Federal Office of Statistics 
markets and the seeming non-competitiveness of the markets suggest that a realistic rate, 
if it exists, may not have materialized. 
While the existence or non-existence of a realistic N/$ exchange rate is debat-
able, that the rate has been unstable and persistently increasing is not, given the evidence 
in Table 5.1. Some analysts have argued that the major explanation is under-funding of 
the market (see Peterside, 1990, for instance). It is a well-established economic doctrine 
that when resources are scarce it is to be expected that FOREX is scarce. As a result, 
rather than blame under-funding, a useful explanation for the trend may be found in the 
structures of the market as well as the complementary macroeconomic policy of govern-
ment. Contrary to the government's promise to place a strict control on budget deficits, 
and also to maintain a tight monetary policy, a quick study of Table 8 shows that over the 
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period of the SFEM operation, the government largely adopted a expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy. 
It did not keep its promise to adjust public expenditure to reflect the revenue 
constraints, with the aim of reducing budgetary deficits. As clearly shown in the table, 
budget deficits actually increased from year to year between 1986 and 1990. The do-
mestic credit, in the same period, rose very sharply above the 5 to 6% targeted by gov-
ernment in 1986. At the same time, money supply rose, especially between 1988 and 
1990. Given the close relationship between aggregate domestic credit, money supply 
and inflation, the same upward trend in the inflation rate also occurred during the period 
(see Table 8). 
One may conclude that the naira's depreciation was partly caused by the market 
structures (see Section IV) and partly brought about by the expansionary fiscal and mon-
etary policies which placed undue pressures on the exchange rate via increased aggre-
gate demand for FOREX. "The so-called "over-bidding' by banks participating in the 
market was made possible by the failure of the fiscal and monetary authorities to pursue 
sufficiently restrictive macroeconomic policies" (Oyejide, 1989, p. 19). 
Exchange rate premium 
The analysis in this section proceeds from the premise that the parallel market rates 
reflect a realistic and efficient exchange rate. Premium is thus measured by the differen-
tial between FEM and parallel market rates. Other measures of premium are the differ-
ential between FEM and autonomous rates and between FEM and Bureau de Change 
rates. It should be noted, however, that the proposition that the parallel rate is the opti-
mal rate is controversial. Given the fact that the official market's share of the FOREX 
market is much larger, the realistic market rate may lie somewhere between the FEM 
and parallel market rate. 
Table 9 shows the three types of premiums identified earlier. Between Decem-
ber 1987 and December 1988, two different rates emerged from the two market types in 
operation - the FEM rate and the autonomous rate (see Table 9). The first column in 
Table 9 shows the premium measured by the differential between the FEM rates and 
autonomous rates. For example, while the FEM rate for December 1987 was N4.1413:US 
$1.00, the autonomous rate for the same month was N4.6928.TJS $1.00, meaning a dif-
ferential premium of N.55. This means that the auction determined rate relative to the 
autonomous market was subsidised by 55 kobo that month. By May 1988, the official 
market determined rate of N4.8138 was being subsidized by as much as 55% given the 
autonomous rate of N6.4943. This trend goes on through the co-existence of the FEM 
and autonomous exchange rate determination. Given that the objective of the SFEM 
was to find the true value of the naira and have a realistic exchange rate, one may con-
clude by looking at the exchange rate premium of the FEM and autonomous rates that 
this objective was not achieved during this period. 
It is for this reason lhat some analysis consider the naira to be overvalued still. 
The premium is even higher in some cases when the differential between the FEM rates 
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Table 9: Exchange rate premium, 1987-90 
Date 
N 
1 
% N 
2 
% 
3 
N % 
December 1987 0.55 13.3 0.46 11.1 
January 1988 0.19 4.5 0.68 16.1 
February 1988 0.02 0.6 0.24 5.6 
March 1988 0.03 0.7 -0.02 -0.4 
April 1988 1.64 38.5 0.05 1.1 
May 1988 2.31 55.2 1.22 29.1 _ 
June 1988 2.61 64.3 1.84 45.1 
July 1988 1.94 44,1 1.96 44.5 
August 1988 2.24 48.1 1.96 42.1 
September 1988 1.11 23.8 2.50 53.3 
October 1988 1.26 26.4 2.55 53.4 
November 1988 1.33 25.8 2.35 45.7 _ 
December 1988 2.93 54.8 2.97 55,4 
January 1989 - 1.81 25.7 
February 1989 3.12 42.2 
March 1989 4.03 53.2 
April 1989 - 3.85 50.8 
May 1989 • 3.87 51.6 
June 1989 4.20 57.2 
July 1989 3.41 47.8 
August 1989 2.9 39.7 2.9 39.7 
September 1989 3.33 45.1 3.23 43.8 
October 1989 2.88 38.5 2.925 39.1 
November 1989 1.65 21.9 1.55 20.6 
December 1989 1.95 25.5 1.85 24.2 
January 1990 - 1.72 21.8 1.72 21.8 
February 1990 1.38 17.4 1.48 18.7 
March 1990 1.26 15.9 1.36 17.1 
April 1990 1.26 15.9 1.36 17.1 
May 1990 1.32 16.6 1.41 17.8 
June 1990 1.50 18.9 1.46 18.4 
July 1990 1.97 24.8 1.91 24.0 
August 1990 - 1.79 22.5 1.72 21.6 
September 1990 - 1.99 24.9 1.77 22.1 
October 1990 - 1.96 24.5 1.79 22.1 
November 1990 - 2.69 25.1 1.78 21.4 
December 1990 1.70 19.6 1.45 16.7 
Note-. Column 1 = Automonous - FEM Rate 
Column 2 = Parallel - FEM Rate 
Column 3 = Bureau de Change - FEM Rate 
Source; Calculations from Table 7. 
for the period December 1987 to December 1988 is compared to the rate from the paral-
lel market for the same period (see column two in Table 9). For example, for September, 
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October and December, 1988, the government, with its FEM determined rates, was 'sub-
sidizing" the naira by over 50%. Again in 1989, from February to September, the ex-
change rate premium in reference to FEM vs. parallel market were so high that the gov-
ernment was 'subsidizing' rates from these months by over 40%. It was later on, in 1989 
and most of 1990, that such subsidies fell below 26%. 
Between August 1989 and December 1990, the official FEM rates were com-
pared to the parallel rates and the. Bureau de Change rates. As with the case of high 
premiums existing between the FEM and parallel market rates, the FEM rates compared 
to the Bureau de Change rates also showed significant levels of premium. For the months 
of August (when the Bureau were created), September and October in 1989, the ex-
change rate premiums were close to or over 40%. Although later months showed lower 
premiums, as with the FEM/parallel market case, the premiums remained high until 
December 1990. Using the official FEM rates, therefore, one cannot say that a realistic 
rate was achieved, especially given the size of excess demand for FOREX in the official 
market, at lower prices that eventually sought to be satisfied in the Bureau de Change or 
parallel markets. 
Conclusively, all through the period of SFEM with the use of the auction mecha-
nism to determine the exchange rates, the main objective of SFEM -i.e., generating a 
realistic exchange rate (with zero premium) through the forces of demand and supply -
was never realised. This has been due to the issues raised in the last part of Section IV. 
Foreign exchange allocation 
When SAP was introduced in 1986 a strong argument was made for the need to have a 
more efficient FOREX allocation. The general belief then was that foreign exchange 
was not adequately made available and it was not properly allocated. So, one of the 
objectives of SAP in introducing SFEM was to come up with a better and more efficient 
method of allocating foreign exchange to the various sectors of the economy. 
From independence, the Nigerian government has adopted a strict and 
well-controlled management of the limited FOREX available. As early as 1962, an Act 
was put in place to specify how FOREX would be made available to Nigerians who 
needed to make transactions with foreign bodies. The then Minister of Finance was 
given the responsibility of controlling the receipts and disbursements of the FOREX, 
and control measures were outlined to monitor how FOREX was spent. However, the 
liberal way in which the "preferred zone of the external trade was supervised compared 
to the non-prefeixed zone led to the inability of the Act to effectively control the move-
ment of FOREX funds". 
By 1967, another Act was designed which lasted until 1971, to allocate FOREX 
among other things on a priority basis. For this reason, imports were classified into 
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essential and non-essential commodities, and FOREX allocated on these basis. The 
problem of too much control and improper classification of commodities led to a more 
relaxed and liberalized exchange control between 1972 and 1980. This was, of course, 
supported by the much improved inflow of FOREX as a result of the increase in price of 
crude oil and the massive accumulation of Nigeria's external reserves. The disastrous 
consequence of the decline in oil prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to the 
dramatic decline in FOREX reserves, beginning from the second half of 1981. This led 
to the enactment of the Economic Stabilisation (Temporary Provisions) Act of April 
1982. In 1984, a new system of FOREX allocation was designed which suggested allo-
cation be made on global, sectoral, sub-sectoral and monthly ceiling (Odozi, 1986). 
To foster a feasible FOREX budget, import licence on a comprehensive scale 
was adopted in the management of FOREX earned. It was, however, not easy to manage 
the import licencing scheme given its bureaucratic nature and the level of corruption 
associated with its use in the allocation of FOREX. By early 1986, it was evident that a 
more efficient method of FOREX allocation was needed to ensure that the limited re-
serve was used judiciously. Hence, with the introduction of SAP, and subsequently the 
SFEM, one of the main objective highlighted in the SAP document was the proper allo-
cation of FOREX to the various sectors of the economy in order to "bring the economy 
back on the path of steady and balanced growth". Also specified as a main objective of 
SFEM was "the elimination of the vices associated with the import licence regime" in 
FOREX allocation. 
In the light of the discussions so far, it is interesting to note how many improve-
ments have been made in allocating FOREX to the different sectors of the economy to 
reflect national need and sectoral contribution to the national objective. Despite the 
various statements of objectives emanating from different political and socio-economic 
policies in Nigeria, there seems to be no coherent and operational set of national objec-
tives which guide policy. There are, rather, very many policies and programmes that are 
made erratically depending on individual leader's 'personal' preferences and mood. In 
such a situation, it is hardly surprising that these policies and programmes do not outlive 
any leader. 
There is no specific national objective which governs how FOREX should be 
allocated under SFEM. Rather, everything is left to market forces to determine what 
proportion of the FOREX supply goes to who or which sector or firm. And of course, 
equity considerations or developmental considerations are non-market issues. With this 
in mind, Table 10 shows that between 1986 and 1990, the industrial sector has consis-
tently received a very large proportion of available FOREX in the official market; 77.6% 
in 1986, 60.3% in 1987, 64.7% in 1988, 68.6% in 1989 and 63.7% in 1990. The next 
largest proportion went to the finished goods category with 19.6%, 27.9%, 24.0%, 22.5% 
and 25.3% in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively. The agricultural sector got 
a meagre 3%, 5%, 6%, 2% and 6% in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
The 'others' category took the remaining proportions. 
f:i M. •! 1: 
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Table 10: Forex allocation to sectors in precentages 
Years Industrial Agric Finished 
Goods 
Others Total 
1960-85 N/A N/A N/A N/A -
1986 77.60 0.30 19.6 2.5 100 
1987 60.3 0.50 27.9 11.9 100 
1988 64.7 0.60 24.0 11.1 100 
1989 68.6 0.20 22.5 8.7 100 
1990 63.7 0.60 25.3 10.6 100 
Note: N/A = notavailable. 
Source: CBN Annual Report, 1986-90 issues, 
This is a far cry from what the SAP was expected to do, i.e. shift resources to tradables. 
The industrial sector, which consumes most of the nation's FOREX (over 60% and close 
to 70% in some years) earns little or no FOREX and contributes only marginally to GDP. 
The agricultural sector, the major non-oil tradable and an important engine of growth, 
has been less favoured. Allocation to this sector has been, on the average, 4% through-
out 1986 to 1990. Without a definite policy to decide what proportion to give to the 
various sectors, this will continue to be the pattern for years to come, as long as those 
who need FOREX in the agricultural sector have ineffective demand in FOREX auction 
market. However, this is consistent with the mechanism of the market. What matters is 
willingness backed by ability rather than need or contribution to national development. 
Whether a less-developed economy can afford to support this structure of resource allo-
cation needs to be examined. While this is not rigorously examined here, suffice to say 
that, rather than generate a steady state growth, it tends to worsen allocative structures 
and, in the process, worsens the inefficiencies in the utilization of scarce resources. 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
This study has examined foreign exchange management in Nigeria between 1960 and 
1990 with the aim of documenting the transformations in the institutional framework of 
FOREX management. 
Foreign exchange management seeks to improve the stock of foreign exchange 
and induce an efficient allocation of available FOREX in a way that will ensure the 
achievements of predetermined goals and objectives. It also involves using part of FOREX 
available to meet international obligations while building on the reserve that will safe-
guard the domestic currency value in the international financial market. 
One of the dominant propositions in the literature is that there is a close relation-
ship between the mechanism of exchange rate determination and the allocation of FOREX 
to consumers on one hand, and the extent to which predetermined economic objectives 
are realised on the other. 
It is for this reason that the study x-rayed the dominant mechanisms within the 
specified period. 
A government may decide to independently fix the exchange rate price, in which 
case a control regime is in place, or may allow the rate to be determined through market 
forces, in which case control is very minimal. 
Between 1959 and mid-1986, Nigeria had a fixed exchange rate system with a 
series of control measures put in place to increase FOREX resources, reduce the FOREX 
disbursement to non-preferred sectors and preserve the FOREX reserves. However, the 
control measures applied were not consistently tightened; the controls were stricter dur-
ing periods of external imbalances. The results of some lapses, coupled with the level of 
corruption and administrative bottlenecks of the import licensing era, led to 1. massive 
outflow of the FOREX reserve relative to the inflow; and 2. overvaluation of the ex-
change rate. 
Between July 1986 and December 1990, with the advent of the SAP, a 
market-determined exchange rate replaced the control regime. The SFEM with the use 
of the auction as a mechanism for determining the "realistic exchange rate" for the naira 
was established in September, 1986. Several modifications have been made in the SFEM 
since its inception: a merger of the First-Tier and Second-Tier markets to form FEM in 
1987; an elimination of the inter-bank autonomous market in 1988 which had existed 
along side FEM; a new system, IFEM, that replaced FEM after the autonomous market 
was abolished; and the creation of Bureau de Change in 1989 to expand the FOREX 
market. Also, different pricing policies have been used at different ties, ranging from the 
average rate, marginal rate, and varying types of Dutch auction, all in a bid to determine 
the naira exchange rate more realistically. Alongside the official markets and the li-
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censed Bureau de Change markets, the parallel market for FOREX has existed. 
Evidence from the analysis shows that, irrespective of changes made either in 
types of auction market operated or the pricing policy used, the naira has depreciated 
tremendously all through the period of study. Moreover, the exchange rate is differenti-
ated rather than homogenised across market types. This seems to have been due to the 
non-competitive structures of these markets and the segregation of the markets. The 
non-competitive structures of the markets seem to point to a non-realization of the ob-
jective of an efficient exchange rate. The allocations of FOREX which have thus been 
induced have been shown in Section IV of this paper to be incapable of shifting re-
sources to tradables, particularly non-oil agricultural exports. 
The industrial sector, which has received over 65% of the stock of FOREX in 
the auction market between 1986 and 1990, neither contributes significantly to FOREX 
inflow nor to GDP. The agricultural sector has over the years of study allocated only an 
average of 4% of the FOREX available for auction. 
The post-SAP era of FOREX management has, as a result, not been as bright as 
expected. It is obvious that the 'liberalization' of FOREX management has not achieved 
most of the desired objectives. A realistic exchange rate seems to have eluded the FOREX 
market, the naira has depreciated to a level where the rationality of continuing with the 
system is being debated. There has been no clear policy for FOREX allocation that takes 
into consideration the achievement of certain national objectives - if one exists at all. 
Given the linkages between other complementary macroeconomic policies and 
the character of exchange rate, the government in 1986 promised, among other things, to 
adequately fund the FOREX auction market, place a tight control on budget deficits, and 
tighten monetary policy. These are promises that were never kept; yet it was expected 
that the FOREX market should turn out an undefined "realistic exchange rate". All 
through the years under study, excess demand has persisted; partly due to government 
policy and partly due to the structures of the market, and arguably due to the structures of 
the economy. For instance, in the area of budget management, in contrast to the promise 
to contain it at the 3% of GDP, it actually averaged 10.3% of GDP in 1986, the very first 
year of the SFEM operation. This trend continued in later years. At the same time, 
instead of the promise that aggregate domestic credit will increase only by an average 5 
to 6%, it went as high as 12.7% in 1986 and 14.3% in 1987. This even doubled in 1988 
to as high as 26.1%. Money supply rose from -1.2% in 1986 to 17.1% in 1987, and by 
1988 it had gone up to 43.9%. 
Of course, the same upward trend in inflation was noticed given the strong rela-
tionship between inflation, aggregate domestic credit and money supply. Given this 
trend, one begins to question the seriousness of government in its attempt to get rid of 
the distortions in economy given that it remains a major source of distortions. 
Despite the changes made with respect to auction markets, pricing policies, etc., 
a fundamental step that government must take is to study and understand the 
inter-relationship of all segments and components of the economy. It should stop treat-
ing each problem from each sector in an isolated manner but begin to see the impact of a 
decision taken in one sector on all others. It is when the economy is viewed in a holistic 
manner that policy measures taken to solve problems in one area - which is seen to affect 
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other areas - will begin to make sense and to have some sense of direction. 
More recently, in March 1992, the Nigerian Government, after a great deal of ad 
hoc policy measures to correct the ills of the FOREX market which failed to stem the 
depreciation of the naira, decided to abolish the auction market. Everyone, including the 
CBN was, from 5 March, 1992, free to sell FOREX at a price that consumers are willing 
to pay. Some believe that this decision was political and not motivated by the need to 
create a better FOREX management. Perhaps, this is correct. Christened 'deregulation' 
of the FOREX market, this move is as fundamental as the SAP, within which the first 
deregulation was operationalised. Our analysis in Section IV indicated that the official 
market approximated a bilateral monopoly and, as such, the allocation of FOREX as 
well as the determination of the rate of exchange were influenced by the relative bar-
gaining power of each side. This is to be expected, since the pressure of bargaining was 
initially in favour of the monopoly CBN and against the authorised dealers who were 
oligopolies. A buyers' cartel was, therefore, a clever response by authorised dealers to 
counteract the advantage of the CBN over them. Once bureau were allowed to operate, 
and authorized buyers were licensed to own them either directly or covertly, the advan-
tage of the CBN in a purely market directed allocation and price determination becomes 
effectively neutralized. 
What emerges from such a market structure is a situation where the buyers' 
cartel keeps bid rates stable (at the official market where they are buyers) while ensuring 
that the rates at the bureau de change (where they are sellers) is not only significantly 
higher than the purchase price, but over time, the two prices are managed in such a way 
that the gap between them is deliberately allowed to widen. It is deliberate because the 
gap constitutes rent which is now enjoyed by authorised dealers. This outcome is very 
similar to what obtained when FOREX was allocated via an import licence, the major 
differences being: 1. formal private organisations rather than government officials and 
related individuals now receive the rents; 2. these rents generate less notice and public 
outcry since they are generated via the market process rather than through government 
controls; and 3. the various levels of government lose out since in this zero sum-game, 
the gain of authorised dealers is the loss of the government, to whom FOREX from oil 
revenue accrue. 
Given this, what is now commonly referred to as '5 March' in Nigeria, repre-
sents simply, a rational move by the government through the CBN to regain the advan-
tage in Nigeria's chess game of market forces. Tagging the move as deregulation by the 
government, is therefore, a clever attempt at covering up a rational but regulatory move, 
in order to regain an advantage it loses via market forces to private organisations (the 
authorised dealers). 3 It could be argued that this step became immediately necessary due 
to a fiscal deficit, the deficit being the result of, on the one hand, fiscal indiscipline by 
government and, on the other, petroleum price shocks. 
That 5 March is regulatory is indicated by the fact that for several weeks after-
wards, even as the demand for FOREX fell drastically by over 70%, the N/$ exchange 
rate remained stable atN18.60:US$1.00. Since then, it fell marginally to N18.53:US$1.00 
where it has since stabilized, even though the demand has been unstable and at lower 
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levels than before 5 March. 
Implicit in this analysis is the fact that efficiency, conceptualized in terms of 
rational allocation and a competitive (as we have earlier defined it) price of FOREX, is 
hardly relevant to the choice of strategy by either the government, the CBN or the pri-
vate authorized dealers. For the government, the major factor seems to be the objective 
of relaxing revenue constraint to its expenditure policy while for the private sector, rent 
and its accumulation and distribution among principal actors are the central issues. If 
this analysis is true, the logical conclusion is that it is almost impossible to generate 
either an efficient allocation of FOREX in Nigeria or a competitive exchange rate of the 
naira. 
We must, however, emphasize that the propositions upon which this generaliza-
tion is based must be empirically evaluated. To do this, it is necessary to examine more 
rigorously than we have done in this study the linkages between the macroeconomic 
policy of government and its interventions in the FOREX market. Here we use interven-
tion to represent the set of government's FOREX management and policy over time. 
This would test, for instance, the hypothesis that Nigeria's macroeconomic policy envi-
ronment is inconsistent with an efficient FOREX allocation and a competitive exchange 
rate for the naira. 
The second major issue to be studied and evaluated is the interaction between 
the various markets. A hypothesis that could be tested is that, given the character of the 
respective markets and their particular linkages, exchange rate convergence is not pos-
sible. We believe strongly that these studies would extend considerably the relevance of 
this study. 
Notes 
1. Official market as used in this paper refers to the markets that are subject to the 
rules and regulations of CBN and are directly under the control of CBN, in which 
case, the Bureau de Change, while a legal FOREX market, is not considered offi-
cial. 
2. It would not only prove difficult to enforce but it would generate strong incentives 
for corruption. However, even more fundamental is that, being a monopolist, the 
CBN can hardly complain of uncompetitive market practices. Besides, the CBN 
has to prove that collusion did indeed take place and this may be very difficult. 
3. Rationality is here conceptualized as the defence of self interest. It was in the 
interest of the government to fix the rate at the rate prevailing in the parallel mar-
ket thus closing the 'rent gap'. This suggests that rationality and competitiveness 
need not be mutually inclusive. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Adjustment and exchange rates in Nigeria 
Stagnation of many Sub-Saharan African economies has necessitated radical changes to re-
duce distortions. Modifications to exchange rate regimes in order to make them more flex-
ible and responsive have included devaluation, adoption of crawling peg regimes, or the 
auctioning of available foreign exchange resources. 
Between 1959 and mid-1986, Nigeria had a fixed exchange rate system with a series of 
control measures put in place to increase foreign exchange (forex) resources, reduce the 
forex disbursement to non-preferred sectors and preserve the forex reserves. However, the 
control measures were not consistently applied; they were stricter during periods of external 
imbalance. The result of some lapses, licensing, led to a massive outflow of the forex re-
serve relative to the inflow and to an overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
Nigeria's forex management and exchange rate policies between 1960 and 1990 fluctu-
ated between the two extreme regimes of excessive regulation and deregulation. In the 
period between 1960 and 1986, the dominant policy was exchange control. After mid-1986, 
this was replaced with an emphasis on deregulation and flexibility in exchange rate determi-
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nation and allocation. 
The shift was necessitated by the crisis in the Nigerian economy during the 1980s. Ex-
change controls were seen to be a major cause of the crisis. Thus, deregulation was 
operationliscd through the introduction of the Second-Tier foreign Exchange Market (SFEM). 
Its major objectives included: 
1. to enable the naira to find its true value; 
2. to achieve a more optimal allocation of forex; 
3. to gradually eliminate the parallel market; and 
4. to eliminate abuses associated with import licenses. 
It was hoped that the SFEM would eliminate the overvaluation of the naira, reduce the ex-
cessive pressure on Nigeria's limited foreign exchange reserves (which dropped significantly 
between 1980 and 1986), encourage and increase in domestic output and forex receipts, and 
utilization of forex, and reduce forex volatility. SFEM was expected to make forex manage-
ment less costly to administer and more efficient to operate. 
Documenting the institutional framework for forex management 
To appraise the effectiveness of this change in policy, it was necessary to document the 
institutional reforms and their implications for the allocation of forex and the determination 
of the rate of exchange of the naira. Has the introduction of the auction actually resulted in 
a more "realistic" exchange rate"? 
This study focussed on institutional transformation on the basis that the character of 
these institutions has a major impact on the efficiency of the operating exchange rate regime. 
A review of the pre-reform policy indicated the weakness of the policy-making and imple-
mentation process of the government. Besides frequent policy variations, the methods of 
implementation of regulations led to corruption and freud. 
In identifying and analysing the performance of the key operational structures of ex-
change rate determination, an attempt is also made to examine whether, given these struc-
tures, a market-directed allocation of forex is growth-inducing and whether a market-deter-
mined exchange rate is competitive. The paper points out that government controls do not 
have a monopoly over distortions: distorted and incompetitive markets independent of gov-
ernment regulations generate distortions, will a mere shift in policy therefore be sufficient to 
induce efficiency? 
The forex markets 
Three distinct markets within which forex is exchanged can be identified in the post-1986 
period: Official markets, bureaux de change, and the parallel market. Several modifications 
were made to the SFEM since its inception: a merger of First-Tier and Second-tier markets 
to form FEM in 1987: the elimination of inter-bank autonomous market in 1988; a new 
system IFEM that replaced FEM after the autonomous market was abolished; the creation of 
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Bureaux de change in 1989 to expand the forex market. Also, different pricing policies were 
used to different times, including the average rate, marginal rate, and various types of Dutch 
auction, all in an attempt to determine the naira exchange rate more "realistically". A paral-
lel forex market existed alongside the official and bureaux throughout the study period. 
The study examines each of the markets in turn, with regard to the participants, regula-
tions and pricing rules, and then compares the exchange rates prevailing in each. It con-
cludes that none of the three market types is perfectly competitive and that the policy shift of 
1986 has failed to achieve its key objectives. 
Impact of other macroeconomic policies 
Government intervention and other controls affecting market structure, participants and pricing 
rules have tended to distort the functioning of the market. This, plus the non-competitive 
structure of the markets, has created a situation in which a large premium continues to exist 
as rent, even higher than the previous levels. Macroeconomic policies, including expansion-
ary fiscal and the exchange rate. Public expenditure, domestic credit and inflation all contin-
ued to rise, placing pressure on the exchange rate through increased aggregate demand for 
forex, and causing the continuing depreciation of the naira. 
Foreign exchange allocation within the Nigerian economy 
One of the objectives of the introduction of the SFEM as part of the structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) was to improve the efficiency of foreign exchange allocation to different 
sectors of the Nigerian economy. This paper asks whether, in fact, the allocation under SFEM 
reflected national need and sectoral contribution to national economic growth. However, the 
paper argues that there was no specific national objective guiding the forex allocation. While 
the SAP was expected to shift resources to tradables, the highest forex allocations were made 
to the industrial sector (between 63 and 77% during 1986-90), the next highest to finished 
goods (19 to 27%) and agriculture received only between 2 and 6%. This was despite the 
fact that agriculture is the major non-oil tradable in Nigeria and an important sector in pro-
moting growth, whereas the industrial sector neither contributes significantly to forex inflow 
nor to GDP. 
Have the reforms achieved their objectives? 
Thorough study of the different aspects of the forex markets in Nigeria demonstrates that the 
liberalisation of forex management has not achieved most of its objectives. This outcome is 
seen to be the result of a number of factors, including but not necessarily limited to the 
following: 
1. the non-competitive nature of the forex markets 
2. the segmentation of the forex market 
3. the lack of clear policy objectives in the allocation of forex to the different economic 
sectors in Nigeria 
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4. the lack of government commitment to the objectives of the SAP, as demonstrated by the 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies 
5. the ad hoc nature of policy measures to correct the distortions in the forex markets 
The paper posits, in conclusion, that the inefficiencies in the two major institutions — gov-
ernment and the market — interact to strengthen distortions in exchange rate determination 
and forex allocation. It recommends that government must improve the efficiency of its 
policy making and implementation. A better understanding of forex market structures and 
the generation of rents is seen to be crucial to improving policy and benefitting from the 
market. As a final caveat, the paper also emphasises the importance of further empirical 
evaluation of these findings. 
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